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1 Introduction
In general, there exist two types of debt issued by firms: market debt and bank debt. When
a firm is unable to service contractual debt payments, that is, default, the firm usually asks
creditors to accept debt payment concessions. The bank may grant concessions through bilateral
renegotiation if the firm is suffered by temporary financial distress, not economically inefficient,
However, since the creditors of market debt are dispersive, it is hard to reach an agreement on
debt payment concessions through renegotiation. In that case, the firm has to go into bankruptcy
directly after default. The creditors seize the alienable physical assets of the firm after paying
the bankruptcy cost. Modelling such corporate features in default is critical in debt valuation
literature and also has large impact on firms’ financing and investment decisions.
Except for Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007), most existing models assume that firms
issue a single class of debt: nonrenegotiable debt (see Leland, 1994; Goldstein, Ju, and Leland,
2001; Sundaresan and Wang, $2007a$) or renegotiable debt (see Mella-Barral and Perraudin,
1997; Fan and Sundaresan, 2000; Sundaresan and Wang, $2007b)^{1}$ Table 1 summarizes the
features of related structural trade-off models. In the table, a symbol $Y$“ implies that the
model incorporates a feature that increases realism. The first row represents each model (e.g.,
$L$“ stands for Leland, 1994; “GJL“ stands for Goldstein, Ju, and Leland, 2001; etc.).
Table 1: Features of related structural trade-off models.
As Hart and Moore (1995) argue, models with single class of debt cannot explain the existence
of different debt structures observed in practice, especially the mixed debt structure. Concerning
bank debt and market debt, existing literature find that the percentage of market debt in
lWhile Sundaresan and Wang (2007b) consider debt renegotiation, Sundaresan and Wang (2007a) focus on
the debt overhang problem and ignore debt renegotiation.
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total debt is increasing in firm size and age (see Houston and James, 1996; Johnson, 1997;
Krishnaswami et al., 1999; and Denis and Mihov, 2003). Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) document
that while small firms issue privately placed debt almost exclusively, large firms are more likely
to issue market debt.
In this paper, we examine the financing and investment decisions under different debt struc-
tures: exclusive market debt (corresponding to Sundaresan and Wang, $2007a$), exclusive bank
debt (corresponding to Sundaresan and Wang, $2007b$), and the mixture of market debt and
bank debt. The major difference between market debt and bank debt stems from the possibility
of renegotiation once the firm falls into financial distress. While the market debt cannot be
renegotiated because of the dispersion of debtholders, the bank may grant state-contingent debt
payment concessions in costless bilateral renegotiation.
The main questions are as follows: How do different debt structures affect firm $s$ financing
and investment decisions? What is the optimal debt structure? Especially, if the third one is
optimal, then what is the optimal mixture of market debt and bank debt? Do the results depend
on firm characteristics?
The most related literature of this chapter is Hackbarth et al. (2007) and Sundaresan and
Wang (2007b). Hackbarth et al. (2007) examine the optimal mixture and priority structure of
bank debt and market debt, without considering the investment decision. Sundaresan and Wang
(2007b) investigate investment under uncertainty with strategic debt service. They provide a
framework to analyze both the financing and investment decisions. However, the debt structure
is limited to a single class.
The contribution of this paper is that we integrate the two strands of literature: investment
and debt structure. We adopt a setting that resembles Hackbarth et al. (2007) and extend their
model in the following dimensions by applying the framework of Sundaresan and Wang (2007b).
First, we incorporate investment decision into the model. In Hackbarth et al. (2007), debt
is issued at the same exogenous investment timing under different debt structures. However,
since the financing and investment decisions interact with each other, the optimal timing of
investment varies under different debt structures and so do the timing of debt issuance. Thus,
it is necessary to incorporate the investment decision to consider the optimal debt structure.
Second, we accommodate varying bargaining powers to the equityholders and the bank during
debt renegotiation in financial distress. This is more flexible in that it comprises the two extreme
case (either the equityholders or the bank can make take-it-or-leave-it offers in debt service)
analyzed in Hackbarth et al. (2007). Third, we consider a reasonable restoration of contractual
debt payment and the associated tax benefits when the EBIT improves.2 In Hackbarth $et$
al. (2007), once the debt renegotiation begins, the debt payment concessions continue forever,
regardless of whether the EBIT has recovered or not. Fourth, we consider that both the bank
debtholders and market debtholders receive a part of the remaining firm value upon bankruptcy.
Thus, we are able to obtain an interior solution of the mixed debt structure, which means that
2In contrast with our model, Hackbarth et al. (2007) assign bargaining powers to the bank and market
debtholders to examine deviations from absolute priority upon bankruptcy. In their paper, if the bank has full
bargaining power, the senior position of the bank is inviolable.
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the optimal bank debt and market debt interact with each other. This result is more realistic
than Hackbarth et al. (2007), who substantially assume that the market debtholders receive
nothing upon bankruptcy in the main part of their model. In such an extreme case, they cna
only obtain a corner solution of the mixed debt structure, which means that the optimal bank
debt and market debt are determined separately and the optimal debt structure is to issue the
bank debt until its capacity and thereafter issue a positive amount of market debt.
2 Model setup
The model is set in a continuous-time risk-neutral framework. We suppose that the firm owns
a privileged right to undertake a project with an irreversible investment cost $I$ . The potential
EBIT generated by the project is given by the following geometric Brownian motion process:
$dX(t)=\mu X(t)dt+\sigma X(t)dz(t)$ , (2.1)
where $\mu$ and $\sigma>0$ are constants and $(z(t))_{t\geq 0}$ denotes a standard Brownian motion under
risk-neutral measure $\mathbb{P}$ . The initial value $X(O)$ is sufficiently low; i.e., the potential EBIT has
not yet been favorable enough to undertake the project. Let $r>0$ denote the discount rate. As
in most real option analysis, we assume $r>\mu$ for convergence.
When the EBIT process $X(t)$ reaches the investment threshold $x^{i}$ (the superscript $i$ “ stands
for investment), the firm decides to exercise the investment option by paying the fixed investment
cost $I$ , which can be financed by equity and debt. For simplicity, we assume that the issued
debt has infinite maturity. The contractual continuous coupon of the perpetual debt is $c$ , which
is tax deductible. Let the corporate tax rate be $\tau$ . After engaging in the investment project,
at each instant, the firm receives the EBIT $X(t)$ and must pay coupon $c$ to debtholders. When
the EBIT $X(t)$ is sufficiently low to hit the default threshold $x^{d}$ (the superscript $d$” stands for
default), the firm fails to pay the contractual coupon. That is, default occurs.
2.1 All-equity financing
First, we consider an all-equity financed firm.
financed firm value after investment is given by
Based on our setup, the after-tax all-equity
$\Pi(x)=E[\int_{t}^{\infty}(I-\tau)e^{-r(s-t)}X(s)ds|X(t)=x]=\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}x$ , (22)
where $E[\cdot|X(t)=x]$ denotes the expectation operator under the risk-neutral measure $\mathbb{P}$ , given
that $X(t)=x$ .
Let the $ex$ ante firm value (firm value before investment, option value of investment) be $V_{U}^{o}(x)$
(the superscript $0$” and subscript $U$” stand for option value and unlevered firm, respectively).
By using the standard real options approach, we obtain the $ex$ ante firm value as:
$V_{U}^{o}(x)=[ \Pi(x_{U}^{i})-I](\frac{x}{x_{U}^{i}})^{\beta}$ , $x\leq x_{U}^{i}$ , (2.3)
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where $\beta$ is the positive root of the quadratic equation
$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}y(y-1)/2+\mu y-r=0$ . (2.4)
That is,
$\beta=\frac{1}{\sigma^{2}}[-(\mu-\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2})+\sqrt{(\mu-\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2})^{2}+2r\sigma^{2}}]>1$ . (2.5)
Then, we determine the optimal investment threshold $x_{U}^{i}$ by maximizing the $ex$ ante firm value
in Eq.(2.3). The results under all-equity financing are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (All-equity financing)
The optimal investment threshold is given by
$x_{U}^{i}= \frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{I}{\Pi(1)}$ . (2.6)
The $ex$ ante fim value is
$V_{U}^{o}(x)=( \frac{x}{x_{U}^{i}})^{\beta}\frac{I}{\beta-1}$ $x\leq x_{U}^{i}$ . (2.7)
3 Equity and exclusive debt financing
From now on, we consider that the firm is partially financed with exclusive debt (market debt
or bank debt), which is issued upon investment. The contractual continuous coupon of the
perpetual market debt and bank debt are $c_{M}$ (the subscript $M$“ stands for market debt) and $C_{B}$
(the subscript $B$ ” stands for bank debt), respectively. As mentioned in Section 1, throughout
this paper, we assume that the firm behaves in equityholders’ interests. Since equity is issued
in all the cases, we hereafter write “debt financing” instead of “equity and debt financing” for
abbreviation.
3.1 Exclusive market debt financing
In this subsection, we examine the case of exclusive market debt financing. We assume that the
market debt cannot be renegotiated when the firm fails to pay the contractual coupon, because
of the dispersion of debtholders. Then, the firm has to declare bankruptcy once falling into
financial distress.
Following Leland (1994), we consider a stock-based definition of bankruptcy whereby equi-
tyholders default on their debt obligations the first time equity value is equal to zero. Let $x_{M}^{b}$
denote the bankruptcy threshold (the superscript $b$” stands for bankruptcy). We assume that
the bankruptcy value is $(1-\alpha)\Pi(x_{M}^{b})$ , i.e., a fraction $(1-\alpha)$ of the unlevered after-tax firm value
$\Pi(x_{M}^{b})$ upon bankruptcy. The parameter $\alpha\in(0,1)$ measures the losses in firm value incurred
by default costs.
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Now, we consider the financing and investment decisions. The investment decision is charac-
terized by an endogenously determined investment threshold $x_{M}^{i}$ . The capital structure decision
involves the choice of the coupon level of debt and an endogenous bankruptcy threshold. The
coupon level $c_{M}(x_{M}^{i})$ , which is characterized by a trade-off between the tax benefits and de-
fault costs of debt financing, is determined simultaneously with the investment decision. In
contrast, the bankruptcy threshold $x_{M}^{b}(c_{M})$ , which depends on the coupon level, is determined
after investment option is exercised. Note that the three endogenous variables in our model
$($ i.e., $x_{M}^{i},$ $c_{M}(x_{M}^{i})$ , and $x_{M}^{b}(c_{M}))$ form a nested structure, and therefore enables us to examine
the interaction between financing and investment decisions.
In the following, we first derive the bankruptcy threshold from the values after investment.
Then, we determine the coupon level, which depends on investment threshold. Finally, we derive
the optimal investment threshold from the values before investment.
3.1.1 Bankruptcy decision
Let the equity value after investment be $E_{M}(x)$ . It must satisfy the following ODE:
$rE_{M}(x)= \mu xE_{M}’(x)+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}E_{M}’’(x)+(1-\tau)x-(1-\tau)c_{M}$ . (31)
In addition, $E_{M}(x)$ must satisfy the following boundary conditions:
$\lim_{xarrow\infty}\frac{E_{M}(x)}{x}<\infty$, $E_{M}(x_{M}^{b})=0$ , $E_{M}’(x_{M}^{b})=0$ . (3.2)
Solving the ODE (3.1) with the boundary conditions above, we obtain
$E_{M}(x)= \Pi(x)-(1-\tau)\frac{c_{M}}{r}-[\Pi(x_{M}^{b})-(1-\tau)\frac{c_{M}}{r}](\frac{x}{x_{M}^{b}})^{\gamma}$ , $x\geq x_{M}^{b}$ , (3.3)
where $\gamma$ is the negative root of the quadratic equation (2.4). That is,
$\gamma=-\frac{1}{\sigma^{2}}[(\mu-\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2})+\sqrt{(\mu-\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2})^{2}+2r\sigma^{2}}]<0$. (3.4)
The optimal bankruptcy threshold is given by
$x_{M}^{b}= \frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}\frac{r-\mu}{r}c_{M}$ . (3.5)
Similarly, the debt value after investment can be derived as:
$D_{M}(x)= \frac{c_{M}}{r}-[\frac{c_{M}}{r}-(1-\alpha)\Pi(x_{M}^{b})](\frac{x}{x_{M}^{b}})^{\gamma}$ , $x\geq x_{M}^{b}$ . (3.6)
The firm value after investment is the sum of equity value and debt value.
$V_{M}(x)= \Pi(x)+\frac{\tau c_{M}}{r}[1-(\frac{x}{x_{M}^{b}})^{\gamma}]-\alpha\Pi(x_{M}^{b})(\frac{x}{x_{M}^{b}}I^{\gamma},$ $x\geq x_{M}^{b}$ . (3.7)
This expression is intuitive. It says that the firm value consists of three terms: the unlevered
firm value, plus the present value of tax benefits, and minus the present value of default costs.
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3.1.2 Coupon level and investment decisions
Before turning to the analysis of coupon level and investment decisions, it is important to make
a clear distinction between the $ex$ ante equity value and $ex$ post equity value. While the $ex$ post
equity value is given by the present value of the cash flow accruing to equityholders after debt
has been issued (see Eq.(3.3)), the $ex$ ante equity value is given by the sum of the $ex$ post equity
value and debt value (see Eq.(3.7)) upon investment. As a result, although equityholders choose
the bankruptcy threshold to maximize the $ex$ post equity value, they choose the coupon level to
maximize the $ex$ ante equity value, internalizing both the tax benefits and default costs of debt
financing.
By maximizing the firm value $V_{M}$ $(x_{M}^{i} ; c_{M})$ upon investment with $c_{M}$ , we have
$c_{M}(x_{M}^{i})= \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\frac{r}{r-\mu}\frac{x_{M}^{i}}{h_{M}}$ , (3.8)
where
$h_{M}=[1- \gamma(1-\alpha+\frac{\alpha}{\tau})]^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}>1$ . (3.9)
Note that the coupon $C_{M}$ is a linear function of $x_{M}^{i}$ , which is endogenously determined later.
Combining Eq.(3.8) with Eq.(3.5), we find that $x_{M}^{i}/x_{M}^{b}=h_{M}>1$ . In other words, the ratio of
investment threshold to bankruptcy threshold is constant.





Having derived the firm value, we next choose the optimal investment threshold $x_{M}^{i}$ to maximize
the $ex$ ante firm value $V_{M}^{O}$ . Since the investment cost financed by equity is $I-D_{M}(x_{M}^{i})$ , the
value-matching condition at the investment threshold is
$V_{M}^{o}(x_{M}^{i})=E_{M}(x_{M}^{i})-[I-D_{M}(x_{M}^{i})]=V_{M}(x_{M}^{i})-I$. (312)
The associated smooth-pasting condition is
$V_{M}^{o\prime}(x_{M}^{i})=V_{M}’(x_{M}^{i})$ . (313)
Therefore, the $ex$ ante firm value is given by
$V_{M}^{o}(x)=[V_{M}(x_{M}^{i})-I]( \frac{x}{x_{M}^{i}})^{\beta}$ , $x\leq x_{M}^{i}$ . (314)
The results under exclusive market debt financing are summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.1 (Exclusive market debt financing)
The optimal solution set of investment threshold, bankruptcy threshold, and coupon level $ij^{3}$
$(x_{M}^{i},$ $x_{M}^{b},$ $c_{M})=( \frac{x_{U}^{i}}{\psi_{M}},$ $\frac{x_{M}^{i}}{h_{M}},$ $\frac{\zeta_{M}}{\psi_{M}h_{M}}I)$ , (315)
where $h_{M}$ and $\psi_{M}$ are defined in $Eq.(3.9)$ and Eq.(3.11), and
$\zeta_{M}=\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{r}{1-\tau}>0$. (316)
The $ex$ ante firm value is
$V_{M}^{o}(x)= \psi_{M}^{\beta}V_{U}^{o}(x)=(\frac{\psi_{M^{X}}}{x_{U}^{i}})^{\beta}\frac{I}{\beta-1}$ , $x\leq x_{U}^{i}$ . (317)
The leverage upon investment is
$L_{M}(x_{M}^{i})= \frac{D_{M}(x_{M}^{i})}{V_{M}(x_{M}^{i})}=\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\frac{1-\xi_{M}1}{\psi_{M}h_{M}1-\tau}$ , (318)
where
$\xi_{M}=[1-(1-\alpha)(1-\tau)\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}]h_{M}^{\gamma}\in(0,1)$. (319)
3.2 Exclusive bank financing
In this subsection, we examine the case of exclusive bank debt financing. Since bankruptcy
is typically costly, there exist ample opportunities for equityholders and debtholders to have
debt renegotiation instead of bankruptcy once the firm falls into financial distress. We assume
that the bank may grant state-contingent coupon concessions in costless bilateral renegotia-
tion. Empirical evidences, including Gilson et al. (1990), report that banks tend to be more
understanding toward firms in financial distress compared to other debtholders.
As before, we solve the decision making problems using backward induction. First, we
investigate the renegotiation process by applying Nash bargaining between equityholders and
debtholders. Both the reduced level of debt service and the renegotiation threshold are derived.
Then, we examine the coupon level and investment decisions.
3.2.1 Renegotiation decision
The first step is to derive the reduced level of debt service and the renegotiation threshold from
values after investment. We suppose that debt renegotiation begins once the EBIT process
hits an endogenously determined threshold $x_{B}^{s}$ (the superscript $s$” and subscript $B$“ stand for
strategic debt service and bank debt, respectively). During the renegotiation region $(0\leq x\leq$
$x_{B}^{s})$ , the contractual coupon $c_{B}$ is reduced to $s_{B}(x)$ , which is derived later. The equityholders
continue to operate the firm. We assume that the tax benefits of debt are suspended. That is,
$s$ This representation of the optimal solution set follows Shibata and Nishihara (2010), in which agency conflicts
are examined.
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the debt in the renegotiation region is treated as equity. As soon as the EBIT goes back to the
normal region $(x\geq x_{B}^{s})$ , the contractual coupon $C_{B}$ and the tax benefits of debt are restored.
Based on the setup above, the firm value satisfies the following ODEs:
$rV_{B}^{n}(x)=(1- \tau)x+\tau c_{B}+\mu xV_{B}^{n\prime}(x)+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}V_{B}^{n\prime\prime}(x)$ , $x\geq x_{B}^{s}$ ,
(3.20)
$rV_{B}^{s}(x)=(1- \tau)x+\mu xV_{B}^{s\prime}(x)+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}x^{2}V_{B}^{s\prime\prime}(x)$ , $0\leq x\leq x_{B}^{s}$ ,
where the subscripts $n$” and $s$“ denote the normal region and the renegotiation region with
strategic debt service, respectively. The boundary conditions are as follows:
$\lim_{xarrow\infty}\frac{V_{B}^{n}(x)}{x}<\infty$ , $V_{B}^{s}(0)=0$ , $V_{B}^{n}(x_{B}^{s})=V_{B}^{s}(x_{B}^{s})$ , $V_{B}^{n\prime}(x_{B}^{s})=V_{B}^{s\prime}(x_{B}^{s})$ . (3.21)
The last condition implies that the first-order derivative of the firm value should be continuous,
since renegotiation is reversible (see Dumas (1991)).
Solving the ODEs (3.20) with the boundary conditions above, we obtain the firm value as
follows:
$V_{B}^{n}(x)= \Pi(x)+\tau\frac{c_{B}}{r}[1-\frac{\beta}{\beta-\gamma}](\frac{x}{x_{B}^{s}})^{\gamma}$ , $x\geq x_{B}^{s}$ ,
(3.22)
$V_{B}^{s}(x)= \Pi(x)+\tau\frac{c_{B}}{r}\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-\beta}(\frac{x}{x_{B}^{s}})^{\beta}$ , $0\leq x\leq x_{B}^{s}$ .
Now, we describe the renegotiation process. Following Fan and Sundaresan (2000), let
$\eta\in[0,1]$ denote the equityholders’ bargaining power, and then $1-\eta$ is the debtholders’ bargain-
ing power. Let $\theta$ be the fraction of $V_{B}^{s}(x)$ that equityholders receive from renegotiation. The
values upon bankruptcy for equityholders and debtholders are reference points of the bargain-
ing process. The incremental value for the equityholders to participate in debt renegotiation
is $\theta V_{B}^{s}(x)$ , because the equity value is zero upon bankruptcy. On the other hand, the incre-
mental value for the debtholders is $(1-\theta)V_{B}^{s}(x)-(1-\alpha)\Pi(x)$ , because the reservation value of
debtholders is $(1-\alpha)\Pi(x)$ upon bankruptcy. Thus, the Nash bargaining solution is characterized
by maximizing
$[\theta V_{B}^{s}(x)]^{\eta}[(1-\theta)V_{B}^{s}(x)-(1-\alpha)\Pi(x)]^{1-\eta}$ . (3.23)
After simple calculations, we obtain
$\theta=\eta-\eta\frac{(1-\alpha)\Pi(x)}{V_{B}^{s}(x)}$ . (3.24)





Substituting $E_{B}^{s}(x)$ into the ODE:
$rE_{B}^{s}(x)=(1- \tau)x-s(x)+\mu xE_{B}^{SJ}(x)+\frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}x^{2}E_{B}^{S’’}(x)$ , $x\leq x_{B}^{s}$ , (3.26)
we obtain the reduced level of debt service as:
$S_{B(x)}=(1-\eta\alpha)(1-\tau)x$, $x\leq x_{B}^{s}$ . (3.27)
We can easily confirm that $s_{B}(x)$ is lower than the contractual coupon $c_{B}$ . The larger the
bargaining power that equityholders have, the greater the concessions that equityholders can
receive during debt renegotiation.
Next, we derive the values in the normal region and determine the debt renegotiation thresh-
old. The following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions describe the equityholders’
optimal debt renegotiation decision by choosing the renegotiation threshold $x_{B}^{s}$ :
$E_{B}^{n}(x_{B}^{s})=E_{B}^{s}(x_{B}^{s})$ , $E_{B}^{n\prime}(x_{B}^{s})=E_{B}^{s\prime}(x_{B}^{s})$ . (3.28)
Therefore, we obtain the equity value in the normal region $(x\geq x_{B}^{s})$ as:
$E_{B}^{n}(x)= \Pi(x)-\frac{(1-\tau)c_{B}}{r}-[(1-\eta\alpha)\Pi(x_{B}^{s})-\frac{c_{B}}{r}(1-\tau-\tau\frac{\eta\gamma}{\beta-\gamma})](\frac{x}{x_{B}^{s}})^{\gamma}$ ,
and the debt renegotiation threshold as:
$x_{B}^{s}(c_{B})= \frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}\frac{1-\tau(1-\eta)c_{B}}{(1-\eta\alpha)\Pi(1)r}$ . (3.29)
For the same level of exogenously given coupon, the renegotiation threshold $x_{B}^{s}$ is higher than
the bankruptcy threshold $x_{M}^{b}$ in Eq.(3.5). As the bankruptcy cost $\alpha$ increases, the difference
between the two thresholds widens. If the equityholders’ bargaining power $\eta$ is zero, then the
renegotiation threshold $x_{B}^{s}$ in Eq.(3.29) is equal to the bankruptcy threshold $x_{M}^{b}$ in Eq.(3.5),
provided the same coupon level.
Similarly, the debt value in the normal region $(x\geq x_{B}^{s})$ can be derived as:
$D_{B}^{n}(x)= \frac{c_{B}}{r}-\frac{c_{B}}{r}[\frac{1}{1-\gamma}+\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}\frac{\tau(\beta-1)(1-\eta)}{\beta-\gamma}](\frac{x}{x_{B}^{s}})^{\gamma}$ . (3.30)
3.2.2 Coupon level and investment decisions
As before, the optimal coupon level is chosen to maximize the firm value in the normal region
upon investment. By maximizing $V_{B}^{s}(x)$ in Eq.(3.22) at $x=x_{B}^{i}$ , we have
$c_{B}(x_{B}^{i})= \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\frac{(1-\eta\alpha)\Pi(1)r}{1-\tau(1-\eta)h_{B}}x_{B}^{i}$ , (3.31)
where
$h_{B}=[ \frac{\beta}{\beta-\gamma}(1-\gamma)]^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}>1$ . (3.32)
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Note that the coupon $C_{B}$ is a linear function of $x_{B}^{i}$ , which is endogenously determined later.
Combining Eq.(3.31) with Eq.(3.29), we find that $x_{B}^{i}/x_{B}^{8}=h_{B}>1$ . In other words, the ratio
of the investment threshold to the renegotiation threshold is constant. Simple calculations give
that $h_{B}<h_{M}$ . That is, the ratio of the investment threshold to the renegotiation threshold
is lower than the ratio of the investment threshold to the bankruptcy threshold. Moreover,
compared to the coupon level of market debt $c_{M}$ in Eq.(3.8), the coupon level of bank debt $CB$
in Eq.(3.31) depends on the tax rate and bargaining power.





Then, we determine the optimal investment threshold $x_{B}^{i}$ to maximize the $ex$ ante firm value:
$V_{B}^{o}(x)=[V_{B}^{n}(x_{B}^{i})-I]( \frac{x}{x_{B}^{i}})^{\beta}$ , $x\leq x_{B}^{i}$ . (3.35)
The results under exclusive bank debt financing are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 (Exclusive bank debt financing)
The optimal solution set of investment threshold, renegotiation threshold, coupon level is
$(x_{B}^{i}, x_{B}^{s}, c_{B})=( \frac{x_{U}^{i}}{\psi_{B}},$ $\frac{x_{B}^{i}}{h_{B}},$ $\frac{\zeta_{B}}{\psi_{B}h_{B}}I)$ , (3.36)
where $h_{B}$ and $\psi_{B}$ are defined in Eq.(3.32) and Eq.(3.34), and
$\zeta_{B}=\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{r(1-\eta\alpha)}{1-\tau(1-\eta)}>0$ . (3.37)
The $ex$ ante fim value is
$V_{B}^{o}(x)= \psi_{B}^{\beta}V_{U}^{o}(x)=(\frac{\psi_{B^{X}}}{x_{U}^{i}})^{\beta}\frac{I}{\beta-1}$ , $x\leq x_{B}^{i}$ . (3.38)
The levemge upon investment is




3.3 Comparison between exclusive debt financing and all-equity financing
In this subsection, we compare the results under exclusive debt financing with those under the
benchmark (all-equity financing). First, we compare the investment thresholds. Since $x_{M}^{i}=$
$x_{U}^{i}/\psi_{M},$ $x_{B}^{i}=x_{U}^{i}/\psi_{B}$ , and $\psi_{M}>1,$ $\psi_{B}>1$ , we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1 (Investment threshold)
The investment thresholds satisfy the following inequalities:
$x_{M}^{i}<x_{U}^{i}$ , $x_{B}^{i}<x_{U}^{i}$ . (3.41)
The economic interpretation of Corollary 3.1 is that, investment advances with debt financing.
Second, we examine the payoff upon investment. Since $V_{M}(x_{M}^{i})=\psi_{M}\Pi(x_{M}^{i}),$ $V_{B}(x_{B}^{i})=$
$\psi_{B}\Pi(x_{B}^{i})$ , we find that the firm values upon investment are all proportional to the investment
threshold. Let $\psi_{j}x_{j}^{i},$ $(j\in\{M, B, *\})$ denote the $ex$ ante firm value (gross payoff upon investment)
in general. The equityholders choose $x_{j}^{i}$ to maximize the $ex$ ante firm value, which is given by the
product of the net payoff upon investment and the investment probability, i.e., $(x/x_{j}^{i})^{\beta}(\epsilon x_{j}^{i}-I)$ .
Consequently, $\psi_{j}x_{j}^{i}=\beta I/(\beta-1)$ .
Corollary 3.2 (Firm value upon investment)
The fim values upon investment are identical;
$\Pi(x_{U}^{i})=V_{M}(x_{M}^{i})=V_{B}(x_{B}^{i})=V_{*}(x_{*}^{i})=\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}$ $I$ . (3.42)
The economic implication of Corollary 3.2 is that, as long as the firm value upon investment
(gross payoff to equityholders) is proportional to investment threshold, the net payoffs upon
investment are identical and independent of financing structures.
Combining the results in Corollary 3.1 and Corollary 3.2, we immediately obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.3 (Option value of investment)
The option values of investment satisfy the following inequalities:
$V_{M}^{O}(x)>V_{U}^{o}(x)$ , $V_{B}^{o}(x)>V_{U}^{o}(x)$ . (3.43)
Because the $ex$ ante firm value is determined by the ordering of $(1/x^{i})^{\beta}$ , the ordering of $ex$ ante
firm values is the opposite of the ordering of investment thresholds.
Since the comparison between the exclusive market debt financing and exclusive bank debt
financing depends on different parameter values, there is no unique dominance between the two
exclusive debt financing. However, when the bank has full bargaining power $(\eta=0)$ , we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 (Weak firm)
For weak firms where the bank has full bargaining power $(\eta=0)$ , bank debt dominates market
debt in that $x_{B}^{i}<x_{M}^{i},$ $V_{B}^{o}(x)>V_{M}^{o}(x)$ . In other words, exclusive bank debt financing is the
optimal debt stmcture.
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This result can be confirmed as follows. According to Eq.(3.34), $\psi_{B}=1+\tau/[(1-\tau)h_{B}]>$
$1+\tau/[(1-\tau)h_{M}]=\psi_{M}$ , because $h_{B}<h_{M}$ . The economic interpretation is that, in the case
of a weak firm, where the bank has full bargaining power, the renegotiation threshold $x_{B}^{s}$ in
Eq.(3.29) is equal to the bankruptcy threshold $x_{M}^{b}$ in Eq.(3.5). Since the bank debt dominates
market debt from the point view of avoiding costly bankruptcy, exclusive bank debt financing
is the optimal debt structure.
When the equityholders have bargaining power $(\eta>0)$ , we cannot determine which exclusive
debt financing is better. Thus, we need to discuss the optimal mixed debt structure in the next
section.
4 Equity and mixed debt financing
In this section, we examine the case of mixed debt financing. The procedures to solve the
problem are similar with those in Section 3.2. As before, we solve the decision making problems
using backward induction.
4.1 Bankruptcy and renegotiation decisions
The firm value after investment satisfies the same ODE as in (3.20), except that the normal
region and the renegotiation region are $x\geq x_{*}^{s}$ and $x_{*}^{b}\leq x\leq x_{*}^{s}$ , where the subscript $*$ ”
corresponds to the expressions with mixed debt financing. The boundary conditions are similar
with thoes in (3.21), except that the second one changes to $V_{*}^{s}(x_{*}^{b})=(1-\alpha)\Pi(x_{*}^{b})$ . Solving the
ODEs with the boundary conditions, we obtain the firm value as follows:
$V_{*}^{n}(x)= \Pi(x)+\frac{\tau}{r}(c_{B*}+c_{M*})[1-\frac{\beta}{\beta-\gamma}(\frac{x}{x_{*}^{s}})^{\gamma}+\frac{\gamma}{\beta-\gamma}(\frac{x_{*}^{b}}{x_{*}^{s}})^{\beta}(\frac{x}{x_{*}^{b}})^{\gamma}]-\alpha\Pi(x_{*}^{b})(\frac{x}{x_{*}^{b}})^{\gamma}$ , $x\geq x_{*}^{s}$
(4.1)
$V_{*}^{s}(x)= \Pi(x)+\frac{\gamma}{\beta-\gamma}\frac{\tau}{r}(c_{B*}+c_{M*})[(\frac{x_{*}^{b}}{x_{*}^{s}})^{\beta}(\frac{x}{x_{*}^{b}})^{\gamma}-(\frac{x}{x_{*}^{s}})^{\beta}]-\alpha\Pi(x_{*}^{b})(\frac{x}{x_{*}^{b}})^{\gamma}$ , $x_{*}^{b}\leq x\leq x_{*}^{s}$ .
We assume that the bank debt and the market debt have equal priority at the bankruptcy
threshold.4 Then, the market debt value is
$D_{M*}(x)= \frac{c_{M*}}{r}-[\frac{c_{M*}}{r}-\frac{c_{M*}}{c_{B*}+c_{M*}}(1-\alpha)\Pi(x_{*}^{b})](\frac{x}{x_{*}^{b}})^{\gamma}$ , $x\geq x_{*}^{b}$ . (4.2)
Now, we describe the renegotiation process. The incremental value for the equityholders to
participate in debt renegotiation is $\theta_{*}(V_{*}^{s}(x)-D_{M*}(x))$ , because the equityholders should pay
market debt coupon even in the renegotiation region. On the other hand, the incremental value
for the debtholders is $(1-\theta_{*})(V_{*}^{s}(x)-D_{M*}(x))-(1-\alpha)\Pi(x)_{C}B*/(c_{B*}+cM*)$ , because the bank
debtholders receive $C_{B*}/(c_{B*}+cM*)$ part of the remaining firm value upon bankruptcy. Thus,
4A number of papers, including Weiss (1990) and Goldstein et al. (2001), report that the priority of claims is
frequently violated in bankruptcy. It is typical that all unsecured debt receives the same recovery rate, regardless
of the issuance date.
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the Nash bargaining solution is characterized by maximizing
$[ \theta_{*}(V_{*}^{s}(x)-D_{M*}(x))]^{\eta}[(1-\theta_{*})(V_{*}^{s}(x)-D_{M*}(x))-\frac{c_{B*}}{c_{B*}+c_{M*}}(1-\alpha)\Pi(x)]^{1-\eta}$ (4.3)
After simple calculations, we obtain
$\theta_{*}=\eta-\eta\frac{(1-\alpha)\Pi(x)}{V_{*}^{s}(x)-D_{M*}(x)}$ . (4.4)
Therefore, we can obtain the equity value $E_{*}^{s}(x)$ and bank debt value $D_{*}^{s}(x)$ in the renegotiation
region $(x_{*}^{b}\leq x\leq x_{*}^{s})$ .The reduced level of debt service is
$s_{*}(x)=[1- \eta+\eta\frac{(1-\alpha)c_{B*}}{c_{B*}+c_{M*}}]x+(1-\eta)c_{M*}$ , $x_{*}^{b}x\leq x_{*}^{s}$ . (4.5)
By maximizing the equity value in the renegotiation region $E_{*}^{s}(x;x_{*}^{b})$ with $x_{*}^{b}$ , we find that the
bankruptcy threshold is determined by the following equation:
$\tau(c_{B*}+c_{M*})(\frac{x_{*}^{b}}{x_{*}^{s}})^{\beta}-\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}r\Pi(x_{*}^{s})[\alpha+\frac{(1-\alpha)c_{M*}}{c_{B*}+c_{M*}}]-c_{M*}=0$ (4.6)
Also, with similar boundary conditions in Eq.(3.28), we obtain the equity value and bank debt




4.2 Coupon level and investment decisions
The optimal coupons of bank debt and market debt are obtained by maximizing $V_{*}^{n}(x_{*}^{i};c_{B*}, c_{M*})$
with $c_{B*}$ and $c_{M*}$ ), respectively. Since the expressions are alittle long, we omit the two equations
od optimization here. The investment threshold is obtained by maximizing
$V_{*}^{o}(x)=[V_{*}^{n}(x_{*}^{i})-I]( \frac{x}{x_{*}^{i}})^{\beta}$ . (4.8)




Since the equations above are all nonlinear in the thresholds, analytical solutions in closed forms
are impossible. In the next section, we calibrate the model to analyze the characteristics of the
solutions and provide several empirical predictions.
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5 Comparison among debt structures
The basic parameters are set as follows: $\mu=0.01,$ $\sigma=0.25,$ $r=0.06,$ $\tau=0.4,$ $\alpha=0.4,$ $\eta=$
$1,$ $I=10,$ $x=1$ . The growth rate $\mu=0.01$ and volatility $\sigma=0.25$ of the EBIT are selected
to match the data of an average Standard and Poor $s$ (S&P) 500 firms (see Strebulaev (2007)).
The discount rate $r=0.06$ is taken from the yield curve on Treasury bonds. The tax rate
$\tau=0.4$ follows the estimation by Kemsley and Nissim (2002). The parameter of proportional
bankruptcy cost $\alpha=0.4$ is chosen to be consistent with Gilson (1997), who report that default
costs are equal to 0.365 and 0.455 for the median firm in his samples.
Figure 1 plots the investment threshold and the $ex$ ante firm value with positive equityholders’
bargaining power. We find that the investment threshold is the lowest and the $ex$ ante firm
value is the largest under mixed debt structure. Therefore, mixed debt structure is the optimal
structure when $\eta>0$ . Under exclusive market debt structure, the investment threshold and
the $ex$ ante firm value are certainly independent of the bargaining power. Under exclusive
bank debt structure and mixed debt structure, the investment threshold increases and the $ex$
ante firm value decreases with the equityholders’ bargaining power. In other words, stronger
equityholders’ bargaining power reduces the $ex$ ante firm value and discourages growth option
exercising even under mixed debt structure. This result extends that in Sundaresan and Wang
(2007a), which examined exclusive bank debt structure only.
$\eta$ $\eta$
Figure 1: Investment threshold and $ex$ ante firm value with positive bargaining power.
Figure 2 displays that the optimal market debt ratio under mixed debt structure. The market
debt ratio increases with the equityholders’ bargaining power. If we consider the equityholders’
bargaining power as a proxy for firm size and age, our results are consistent with the empirical
findings in Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami et al. (1999),and Denis
and Mihov (2003), who find that the percentage of market debt in total debt is increasing in
firm size and age.
According to our computation, the results above are robust across a wide range of parameter
values. Therefore, we summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 (Strong firm)
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Figure 2: Market debt ratio with positive bargaining power.
For strong fims where equityholders have bargaining power $(\eta>0)$ , mixed debt structure is
the optimal debt $strv4cture$ . Moreover, the market debt mtio increases with the equityholders’
bargaining power.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined firm $s$ financing and investment decisions under different debt struc-
tures. Our results demonstrate that: (i) For strong $($ i.e., large$/mature)$ firms where equityholders
have bargaining power, mixed debt structure is optimal, because investment occurs the earliest
and the $ex$ ante firm value is the largest. The ratio of market debt to the total mixed debt
increases with the equityholders’ bargaining power. (ii) For weak (i.e., small/emergent) firms
where the bank has full bargaining power, exclusive bank debt structure is optimal, since bank
debt dominates market debt. The results that the optimal debt structure depends on firms’
characteristics are consistent with the empirical finding in Blackwell and Kidwell (1988), which
report that while small firms issue privately placed debt almost exclusively, large firms are more
likely to issue market debt.
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